









THE CONTINENTAL RIGHTS AND RELATIONS OF OUR COUNTRY.

# SPEECH OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

IN SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 26, 1853.

MR. PRESIDENT :

On the 23d day of February, 1848, John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts, who had completed a circle of public service filling fifty years, beginning with an inferior diplomatic function, passing through the Chief Magistracy, and closing with the trust of a Representative in Congress, departed from the earth, certainly respected by mankind, and, if all posthumous honors are not insincere and false, deplored by his countrymen.

On a fair and cloudless day in the month of June, 1850, when the loud and deep voice of wailing had just died away in the land, the Senator from Michigan, of New England born, and by New England reared, the leader of a great party, not only here, but in the whole country, rose in the Senate Chamber, and after complaining that a member of the family of that great Statesman of the East, instead of going backwards with a garment to cover his infirmities, had revealed them by publishing portions of his private diary, himself proceeded to read the obnoxious extracts. They showed the author's strong opinions, that by the Federal compact the slaveholding class had obtained, and that they had exercised, a controlling influence in the Government of the country.

Placing these extracts by the side of passages taken from the Farewell Address of Washington, the Senator from Michigan said, "He is unworthy the name of 'an American who does not feel at his heart's core the difference between the 'lofty patriotism and noble sentiments of *one* of these documents, and——; but 'I will not say what the occasion would justify. I will only say, and that is 'enough, *the other*, for it is *another*.'" "It cannot, nor will it, nor should it, 'escape the censure of an age like this." "Better that it had been entombed, 'like the ancient Egyptian records, till its language was lost, than thus to have 'been exposed to the light of day."

The Senator then proceeded to set forth by contrast his own greater justice and generosity to the Southern States, and his own higher fidelity to the Union. This was in the Senate of the United States. And yet no one rose to vindicate the memory of John Quincy Adams, or to express an emotion even of *surprise*, or of *regret*, that it had been thought necessary thus to invade the sanctity of the honored grave where the illustrious statesman who had so recently passed the gates of death was sleeping. I was not of New England, by residence, education, or descent, and there were reasons enough, why I should then endure in silence a pain that I shared with so many of my countrymen. But I determined, that when the tempest of popular passion that was then raging in the country should have passed by, I would claim a hearing here—not to defend or vindicate the sentiments which the Senator from Michigan had thus severely censured, for Mr. Adams himself had referred them, together with all his actions and opinions concerning slavery—not to this tribunal, or even to the present time, but to that after age which gathers and records the impartial and *ultimate judgment* of mankind—but to show how just and generous he had been in his public career towards all the members of this Confederacy, and how devoted to the Union of the States and to the aggrandizement of this Republic. I am thankful that the necessity for performing that duty has passed by, and that the Statesman of Quincy has, earlier



than I hoped, received his vindication, and has received it, too, at the hands of him from whom it was justly due—the accuser himself. I regret only this—that the vindication was not as generously as it was effectually made.

There are two propositions arising out of our interests in and around the Gulf of Mexico, which are admitted by all our statesmen. One of them is, that the safety of the Southern States requires a watchful jealousy of the presence of European Powers in the Southern portions of the North American continent; and the other is, that the tendency of commercial and political events invites the United States to assume and exercise a paramount influence in the affairs of the nations situated in this hemisphere; that is, to become and remain a great Western Continental Power, balancing itself against the possible combinations of Europe. The advance of the country towards that position constitutes what, in the language of many, is called “Progress;” and the position itself is what, by the same class, is called “Manifest Destiny.” It is held by all who approve that progress and expect that destiny, to be necessary to prevent the re-colonization of this continent by the European States, and to save the island of Cuba from passing out of the possession of decayed Spain, into that of any one of the more vigorous maritime Powers of the Old World.

In December, 1823, James Monroe, President of the United States, in his annual message to Congress, proclaimed the first of these two policies substantially as follows: “The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power; and while existing rights should be respected, the safety and interest of the United States require them to announce that no future colony or dominion shall, with their consent, be planted or established in any part of the North American continent.” This is what is called, here and elsewhere, the Monroe Doctrine, so far as it involves re-colonization.

John Quincy Adams and John C. Calhoun were then members, chief members, of Monroe’s Administration. John Quincy Adams afterwards acknowledged that he was the author of that doctrine or policy; and John C. Calhoun, on the 15th of May, 1848, in the Senate, testified on that point fully. A Senator had related an alleged conversation, in which Mr. Adams was represented as having said that three memorable propositions contained in that message, of which what I have quoted was one, had originated with himself. Mr. Calhoun replied, that Mr. Adams, if he had so stated, must have referred to only the one proposition concerning re-colonization, (the one now in question,) and then added as follows: “As respects that, his (Mr. Adams’s) memory does not differ from mine. \* \* \* \* It originated entirely with Mr. Adams.”—*App. Cong. Globe*, 1847-8, p. 631.

Thus much for the origin of the Monroe Doctrine on re-colonization. Now, let us turn to the position of John Quincy Adams, concerning national jealousy of the designs of European Powers upon the island of Cuba. The recent revelations of our diplomacy on that subject begin with the period when that statesman presided in the Department of State. On the 17th of December, 1822, Mr. Adams informed Mr. Forsyth, then American Minister in Spain, that “the island of Cuba had excited much attention, and had become of deep interest to the American Union;” and, referring to reported rival designs of France and Great Britain upon that island, instructed him to make known to Spain “the sentiments of the United States, which were favorable to the continuance of Cuba in its connection with Spain.” On the 28th of April, 1823, Mr. Adams thus instructed Mr. Nelson, the successor of Mr. Forsyth:

“The islands of Cuba and Porto Rico still remain, nominally, and so far really dependent upon Spain, that she yet possesses the power of transferring her own dominion over them to others. These islands, from their local position, are natural appendages to the North American continent; and one of them, Cuba, almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations, has become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas; *the character of its population*; its situation midway between our Southern coast and the island of St. Domingo; its safe and

capacious harbor of the Havana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same advantage; the nature of its productions and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial—give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no other foreign territory can be compared, and little inferior to that which binds the different members of this Union together. Such, indeed, are, between the interests of that island and of this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations, formed by nature, gathering in the process of time, and even now verging to maturity, that, in looking forward to the probable course of events, for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. It is obvious, however, that for this event we are not yet prepared. Numerous and formidable objections to the extension of our territorial dominions beyond sea, present themselves to the first contemplation of the subject; obstacles to the system of policy by which alone that result can be compassed and maintained, are to be foreseen and surmounted, both from at home and abroad; but there are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation; and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from its bosom.

"It will be among the primary objects requiring your most earnest and unremitting attention, to ascertain and report to us every movement of negotiation between Spain and Great Britain upon this subject. \* \* \* \* \* So long as the constitutional Government may continue to be administered in the name of the King, your official intercourse will be with his ministers, and to them you will repeat, what Mr. Forsyth has been instructed to say, that the wishes of your Government are that Cuba and Porto Rico may continue in connection with independent and constitutional Spain."

Thirty years afterwards, viz: on the 4th day of January, 1853, the Senator from Michigan, [Mr. Cass,] without one word of acknowledgment of Mr. Adams's agency in instituting those measures of "progress" towards the "manifest destiny" of the country, submitted the resolutions which are under consideration, and which are in these words:

*"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States do hereby declare that 'the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power;' and while 'existing rights should be respected,' and will be by the United States, they owe it to their own 'safety and interests' to announce, as they now do, 'that no future European colony or dominion shall, with their consent, be planted or established on any part of the North American continent;' and should the attempt be made, they thus deliberately declare that it will be viewed as an act originating in motives regardless of their 'interests and their safety,' and which will leave them free to adopt such measures as an independent nation may justly adopt in defence of its rights and its honor.*

*"And be it further resolved, That while the United States disclaim any designs upon the island of Cuba, inconsistent with the laws of nations and with their duties to Spain, they consider it due to the vast importance of the subject to make known, in this solemn manner, that they should view all efforts on the part of any other Power to procure possession, whether peaceably or forcibly, of that island, which, as a naval or military position, might, under circumstances easy to be foreseen, become dangerous to their Southern coast, to the Gulf of Mexico, and to the mouth of the Mississippi, as unfriendly acts directed against them, to be resisted by all the means in their power."*

In bringing together these actions of John Quincy Adams in 1822, and of the Senator from Michigan in 1853, and placing them in juxtaposition in the history of the Senate, I have done all that the Senator from Michigan seems to have left undone, to vindicate the departed statesman from the censures heaped upon him by the living one in 1850.

I proceed to consider the resolutions thus offered by the Senator from Michigan.

The honorable Senator from New Hampshire offers an amendment, as a condition of his vote, in these words:

*"And be it further resolved, That while the United States in like manner disclaim any designs upon Canada, inconsistent with the laws of nations, and with their duties to Great Britain, they consider it due to the vast importance of the subject to make known, in this solemn manner, that they should view all efforts on the part of any other Power to procure possession, whether peaceably or forcibly, of that province, which, as a naval or military*



position, must, under circumstances easy to be foreseen, become dangerous to their northern boundary and to the lakes, as unfriendly acts directed against them, to be resisted by all the means in their power."

I will vote for that amendment. It is not well expressed. But it implies the same policy in regard to Canada which the main resolutions assert concerning Cuba. The colonies, when they confederated in 1775, invited Canada to come in. Montgomery gave up his life in scaling the Heights of Abraham, in the same year, to bring her in. Scott, in 1814, poured out his blood at Chippewa to bring her in. If the proposition shall fail, I shall lament it as a repudiation by the Senate of a greater national interest than any other distinct one involved in this debate; but I shall, nevertheless, vote for the resolutions of the Senator from Michigan. I shall do so, because—

1st. The reverence I cherish for the memory of John Quincy Adams, the illustrious author of the policy which they embody, inclines me to support them.

2d. While I do not desire the immediate or early annexation of Cuba, nor see how I could vote for it at all until Slavery shall have ceased to counteract the workings of nature in that beautiful island, nor even then, unless it could come into the Union without injustice to Spain, without aggressive war, and without producing internal dissensions among ourselves, I nevertheless yield up my full assent to the convictions expressed by John Quincy Adams, that this nation can never safely allow the island of Cuba to pass under the dominion of any Power that is already, or can become, a formidable rival or enemy; and cannot safely consent to the restoration of colonial relations between any portions of this continent and the Monarchies of Europe.

The re-establishment of such relations would of course reproduce in a greater or less degree the commercial and political embarrassments of our relations with other American communities, and even with European nations, from which we obtained relief only through the war of 1812, and the subsequent emancipation of the Spanish colonies on this continent, and their organization as free and independent Republics. Sir, I am willing, on the demand of the Senator from Michigan, or of any other leader, and without any demand from any leader, to declare myself opposed—radically opposed—opposed at all times, now, henceforth, and forever—opposed, at the risk of all hazards and consequences, to any design of any State or States on this continent, or anywhere else, which may, by possibility, result in re-producing those evils—the greatest which could befall this country, short of that greatest of all, to which they would open the way—the subversion of our own hard-won independence, and the returning dominion of some European Power over ourselves. I shall therefore vote for these resolutions, if it shall please the Senate to come to decisive action upon them, and I shall vote for re-affirming and maintaining the principles of John Quincy Adams, as defined in the Monroe Doctrine, and in his policy in regard to Cuba, at all times, and under all circumstances whatsoever.

But while thus expressing my devotion to those principles, I cannot too strongly express myself against the manner in which they have been brought in issue here on this occasion. The issue is made at a time, and under circumstances, which render it inevitable that we must fail, signally fail, in maintaining the great principles which it involves.

The issue is raised at a wrong time. We are more than half way through a session constitutionally limited to ninety days, and engaged with vast and various subjects which cannot be disposed of without long and most discursive debate.

I think the issue is raised in a wrong way. Practically, and by custom, the President of the United States holds the initiative of measures affecting Foreign Relations. The President now in the palace will go out in thirty days, and his sanction, even if we had it, would therefore be of no value. But even that sanction, such as it would be, is withheld—and, I must confess, rightly withheld. The people have elected a new President, who is just ready to enter the palace, and upon whom the responsibilities of the conduct of Foreign Relations, for four years at least, must rest. Not only do we not know what his opinions on this question are, but our action would anticipate the publication of those opinions, and embar-



pass—is it too strong an expression to say, factiously embarrass?—the incoming Administration.

Moreover, we are not only required to advance in this matter without the light that Executive exposition might throw upon our path, but we are required to proceed without the aid or advice of the Committee to whom the care of Foreign Relations has been confided by the Senate, and, as there is reason to believe, in opposition to their deliberate judgment.

Again, it results from the very nature of the case that a majority for the resolutions cannot be obtained, either in the Senate, or in Congress, or in the country.

The principles involved in the resolutions have become a tradition among the American People, and on acknowledged occasions they would act upon them as traditions vigorously and with unanimity. On the other hand, the Americans are a practical people, engrossed with actual business affairs, and they will not act upon abstract principles, however approved, unless there be a necessity, or at least an occasion. So it has happened with the Monroe Doctrine on re-colonization, and with the national policy concerning Cuba. They are thirty years old: they are generally accepted; and yet, not only have they never been affirmed by Congress, but Congress has refused to affirm them, solely for the reason that there was no pressing necessity, no particular occasion, for such an affirmation. Whenever a necessity or an occasion arises, it produces a popular sentiment or passion. The Northern States are content now; they do not fear re-colonization, and do not want Cuba. The Southern States are content; they do not now desire political excitement, and they are not prepared for anything that may involve the nation in war. It is not to be denied, also, that the recent unwise and unnecessary exposition of our diplomatic correspondence throughout a period of thirty years, concerning the island of Cuba, is regarded as having created embarrassments which only the lapse of some time can remove.

The Senator from Michigan seems to be aware of these difficulties, and therefore he labors to show that there is a *necessity*, or at least an *occasion*, for action. But he fails altogether in showing any *new* occasion—which, to the apprehension of the Senate and the country, is equivalent to failing to show any necessity or occasion. What are his facts? 1st. In regard to Great Britain and re-colonization. The grasping spirit shown by Great Britain in the Maine Border question, and in the Oregon question. The Monroe Doctrine, as expounded by Monroe himself, declared that *existing* rights were to be respected—Great Britain asserted that her claims in those cases were existing rights. Those questions have been settled, rightly or wrongly, and have passed away. What more? The British claim on the Mosquito coast? That, also, is settled by treaty. The organization of the Bay of Islands as a distinct colony? That, too, falls within the subject matter of a treaty. In each of these cases Great Britain has violated treaty stipulations, or she has not. If she has not, then there is no cause for any action—if she has, then the remedy is not an affirmation of the Monroe Doctrine, but direct Protest or War.

I give Great Britain small credit for moderation. I think she has just as much as we have, and no more. We are of the same stock, and have the common passion of a common race for dominion. But the country will be unable to discover that the recent events show any aggressions on her part, which constitute an occasion for an affirmation of the Monroe Doctrine by Congress. And now, secondly, as to Cuba. What has Great Britain done? Nothing but just what we have done. She has sent armed ships to prevent invaders from revolutionizing the island, and so severing it from its ancient connection with Spain. We have done the same. She has also proposed to enter into an agreement with us, that neither will acquire Cuba, or suffer others to acquire it. We have declined. The natural conclusion would be, that she was more forbearing than we. But the Senator avoids this by charging that the proposition was insincerely and hypocritically made on her part. British writers were before him in making that charge against us, founded on our voluntary revelations of our own diplomacy in regard to Cuba. I am too American to confess their charge to be just, and not enough American to fling it back upon Great Britain for mere retaliation.

What has France done by way of re-colonization? Nothing. A French adven-

turer, Count Boulbon, has attempted to revolutionize the Mexican State of Sonora, and failed. There is not a word of evidence to connect the French Government or People with that movement. And for all that French newspapers here or in Paris may say, we know full well, that just as fast as the Mexican States shall be severed from the Mexican stock, by whomsoever it may be effected, they will seek annexation, not to France or to any other European Power, but to the United States. Nor has France interposed, in regard to Cuba, otherwise than as we have ourselves interposed, to keep it in the possession of Spain.

So much for the *acts* of European Powers on the subjects of Colonization and Cuba.

What remains of the Senator's case seems scarcely to merit grave consideration. It consists, first, of ominous articles in newspapers. But even we, the most newspaper-loving nation in the world, make our designs and policy known, not through the newspapers, but by public acts and official agents; and France and Great Britain do the same. The Press speaks on all occasions, but for itself always. No wise and calm statesman in either country feels himself compromised by what the Press may assume to speak for or against him, much less does either Government acknowledge any necessity for avowing or disavowing what the Press may allege. The language of the Press of any country, therefore, even if it were general, would not warrant national action by any other Government—much less would that language warrant such action when it was spoken by only one out of a thousand or five thousand journals.

Secondly, the Senator from Michigan invokes our attention to what Lord George Bentinck has said in the British Parliament. Well, sir, that is important, what an English Lord has said, and said in *Parliament*, too. That must be looked into. Well, what did Lord George Bentinck say? Sir, he said very angry things—very furious things—indeed, very ferocious things. Prepare yourself to hear them, sir. Lord George Bentinck did say, in so many words, and in *Parliament*, too! what I am going to repeat. His Lordship did say that

“He quite agreed with Captain Pilkington!”

Ay, sir, his Lordship did say that “he quite agreed with Captain Pilkington!” Ominous words—fearful conjunction; an English Lord and an English Captain! But this was not all, not by any means all that Lord George Bentinck said. He said, also,

“They would never put down the slave trade, so long as it depended upon blockading 10,260 miles of coast, and he would do what Captain Pilkington had recommended.” And what do you think it was that Captain Pilkington had recommended? Be patient, I pray you, and hear Lord George Bentinck explain. What Captain Pilkington recommended was, “to strike a blow at the *Head*, and not the *Hand*. He would not send an army to destroy every individual hornet, but he would go to the hornet's nest at once.” Yes, sir; and Lord George Bentinck not only echoed all these severe things which had been said by Captain Pilkington, as aforesaid, but he said also on his own account, “Let us take possession of Cuba, and settle the question altogether. Let us distrain upon it for the just debt due, and too long asked in vain, from the Spanish Government.” As for the rest of the alarming sayings of his Lordship, I forbear from repeating them. Are they not written in the Appendix to the Congressional Globe, for the years 1847 and 1848, published by Blair & Rives, printers of the Debates of Congress, at page 607?

And now, sir, it may assuage the passion and abate the fear that these threats of Lord George Bentinck to distrain upon a hornet's nest have excited, when I state, first, that they are old, and not new. They were uttered five years ago; namely, on the 3d of March, 1848. Secondly, that George Bentinck was a Lord only by courtesy, and not a *real* Lord. Thirdly, that Lord George Bentinck was in a very harmless minority in Parliament when he uttered them, it being, indeed, unknown that he had any confederate in his wicked designs but Captain Pilkington. Fourthly, that this alleged speech was brought before the Senate and the American people, in 1848, by a late member of this body, whose constitutional proclivity to wit and humor was so great as to justify the belief that the speech,



like the Donaldson and Greer correspondence, was a hoax, (Mr. W.) Fifthly, that Lord George Bentinck died some years ago, and Captain Pilkington not having been heard of for a long time, there is a strong presumption that the loss of his noble friend and chivalrous ally has thrown him into a decline.

The tone of the speech of the Senator from Louisiana, (Mr. SOULE,) was one of complaint against the Administration of our Government, and against France and Great Britain. The Administration was censured for austerity towards the associates of Lopez. But either it could have protected or vindicated them consistently with law and treaties, or it could not. If it could, then the Senator's censures are too lenient; if it could not, they are altogether unjust. Since the day when the gifted, ingenuous, and gentle Andre was executed on a gallows as a spy, by order of Washington, we have known the painful delicacy of executing general laws upon persons whose motives and bearing justly excited our respect and compassion. The Senator's sympathy in this case is right. It is only the perversion of it to awaken prejudice against the Administration that I condemn. France and Great Britain are said to have menaced us by saying in their correspondence, that a renewal of such an expedition as that of Lopez might endanger the peace of the nations. No such expedition can be undertaken, of which it can be certainly affirmed that it will not in its consequences lead to a war. I think, therefore, that none but a jaundiced eye, such as does not belong to the President, or to the Secretary of State, could have discovered the insult thus complained of, and that therefore they may be excused for having received it in silence.

The Senator shows us that six or seven years ago Spain herself meditated the establishment of a monarchy in New Grenada, and only 140 years ago, a proposition was made to the British Ministry to privately seize the Island of Cuba in a time of peace and friendship. These facts would have been pertinent, perhaps, if the Senator had advised us to seize the Havana. But I understood him, on the contrary, to discountenance not only conquest, but even purchase, and to agree with those of us who propose to wait for the fruit to ripen, although he has been at some pains to show us that it may rot in the ripening. Indeed, Mr. President, the Senator's argument seemed to me a meandering stream that visited and touched all the banks of controversy, but glided gracefully away from them, and especially avoided plunging into the depths of any conclusion.

Its tendency, I think, was to exasperate the American People against the European Powers, and to irritate them. I cannot sympathize with such a spirit. I would submit to no real wrong, and justify no oppression or tyranny committed by them. But, on the other hand, I will seek no factitious cause of controversy. I want no war with them. We are sure to grow by peace. A war between the two continents would be a war involving not merely a trial which was the strongest, but the integrity of our Republic. Before such a war shall come, I want to see Canada transferred from her false position in Europe, to her true position on this continent, Texas peopled like Massachusetts, the interior of the continent cultivated like Ohio, and Oregon and California not only covered like New York with forts and arsenals and docks and navy yards, but grappled fast to New York and Washington by an iron chain that shall stretch its links through the passes of the Sierra Nevada and the Rocky Mountains.

The Senator tells us that the question of the acquisition of Cuba may be upon us to-morrow, and may not be upon us for twenty-five years. That is to say, it stands now, so far as we can see, where it has stood for twenty-five years past. But he advises us to be ready. That is just what I propose to do. And the way to keep ready is to keep cool. If we keep cool, we shall be none the less prepared, if the portentous question shall indeed come to-morrow; while, on the other hand, excessive heat prematurely generated will be sure to pass off before the expiration of the longer period.

Mr. President, let us survey our ground carefully and completely. Political action, like all other human action, is regulated by whither than the caprice or policy of Princes, Kings, and States. There is a time for colonization, and there is a time for independence. The colonization of the American hemisphere by European Powers was the work of the 16th and 17th centuries; the breaking



up of colonial dependence, and the rise of independent American States, is the work of the 18th and 19th centuries. It is a work that does not go on as broadly and as rapidly as we could wish, but it does not go backwards. It goes faster than was to have been expected under the circumstances, for it began when the United States alone, of all the colonies, Spanish, French, and English, had attained adequate strength and sufficient preparation for successful self-government. European States cannot establish new colonies here, for the same reason that they cannot long retain their old ones. As for France, she surrendered all her continental American Empire to Great Britain in 1763, except Louisiana and Cayenne. Napoleon sold Louisiana to us in 1803, because even *he* could not keep it for France. She keeps Cayenne only because it is not worth the cost of conquest. What does she want of more American colonies, to be severed from her as soon as matured?

Great Britain, too, lost in the American Revolution all her American possessions but a remnant. She keeps the remnant from pride, not interest, as Spain does Cuba. What does she want of more American colonies, to draw upon the home treasury for defence and support, and to become independent as soon as they shall become strong? Canada is only a nominal colony or dependency. Great Britain yet retains Canada, only by yielding to her what she denied to us—fiscal independence.

And now, what does France or Great Britain want of Cuba? It is a slave colony. They have abolished slavery in all their possessions. Should either of them obtain that island, the first act of Government there must be the abolition of slavery. The abolition of slavery, too, must be made with compensation, and the compensation must be drawn from the home treasury. Will either of them take Cuba at such a cost? And what would Cuba, without slavery, be worth to either of those Powers? Let their experience in the West Indies answer. Cuba, without slavery, would be valueless to any European State. Cuba, with slavery, can belong to no European State but Spain. Cuba, without slavery, would be worthless to any Power but the United States, and John Quincy Adams was right; Cuba, either with or without slavery, gravitates towards, and will ultimately fall into, the American Union.

What, then! has France ceased to be ambitious, and has Great Britain adopted the policy that Augustus Cæsar bequeathed to Rome, to forbear from extending the bounds of Empire? Not at all. France and England are unchanged. I do not know that as yet they have learned that their power cannot be renewed or restored in America. But I do know that they will find it out when they try to renew and restore it again; and therefore all the alarms raised by the Senator from Michigan pass by me like the idle winds. The Monroe Doctrine was a right one—the policy was a right one, not because it would require to be enforced by arms, but because it was well-timed. It was the result of a sagacious discovery of the tendency of the age. It will prevail if you affirm it. It will equally prevail if you neglect to affirm it hereafter as you have refused to do heretofore. As a practical question, therefore, it has ceased to be. It is obsolete. You are already the great Continental Power of America. But does that content you? I trust it does not. You want the commerce of the world, which is the empire of the world. This is to be looked for, not on the American lakes, nor on the Atlantic coast, nor on the Caribbean sea, nor on the Mediterranean, nor on the Baltic, nor on the Atlantic ocean, but on the Pacific ocean, and its islands, and continents. Be not over-confident. Disregard not France, and England, and Russia. Watch them with jealousy, and baffle their designs against you. But look for those great rivals where they are to be found—on those continents and seas in the east where the prize which you are contending with them for is to be found. Open up a highway through your country from New York to San Francisco. Put your domain under cultivation, and your ten thousand wheels of manufacture in motion. Multiply your ships, and send them forth to the east. The nation that draws most materials and provisions from the earth, and fabricates the most, and sells the most of productions and fabrics to foreign nations, must be, and will be, the great Power of the Earth.

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